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Cornell University School of Law.
Once more the flexibility of the conrnon law has
been put to the test ; once-,,more it has answered new
questions, as to a new instrunent of coinnerce-the
telephone. For barely forty years the judges of our
courts have been drawing heavily upon the resources of
analogy that they might solve knotty questions in re-
gard to the duties and liabilities of its twin sister,
the telegraph. And before that law has become settled,
inventive ,genius has projected into the legal world a
new but in many respects similar instrunent of coirnuni-
cation, whose duties and liabilities must likewise be
fixed by the courts. But, though a decade has elapsed
since its introduction, the adjudications in these mat-
ters have been few and limited. And three causes may
be assigned for this. The courts of Great 7ritain
within two years after the first telephone line was used
decided that a conversation through a telephone is a
"telegram" and that the telephone business, whether
occupied in the transmission of separate messages or in
maintaining exchanges, comes within the English statute
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of 1869, giving to the postmaster general the exclusive
control of the business of transmitting messages by
telegraph. (Atty Geni v Edison Telephone Co., 6 Q.B.D.
244.) Consequently, no cases involving telephone law
are to be found in the English reports. Then, a second
reason is the general acceptance by the coirnercial
world of the analogy of the telephone to the telegraph
business and its willingness to be satisfied if it gets
the same treatment from the former as from the latter.
Finally, all the telephone interests of this country from
almost the very first have been concentrated in one
great company- The American Bell Telephone Co., of
Massachusetts- which fully aware of the fact that comnon
law cannot be killed in the womb like legislative enact-
ments and yet is as obligatory as statute law has shrewd-
ly avoided litigation; in fact, it has assisted its
mighty ally, the Western Union Telegraph Company, in
destroying or absorbing their litigous competitors.
The Nature of the Business.
A magnetic telephone is a mechanical device capable
of transmitting articulate speech through wires by the
power of magnetism and electricity. (American Rapid Tel.
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Co. v Connecticut Teleph. Co., 49 Conn. 371.) So it
is practicable for the general public to make individual
use of it ; and the business which the telephone com-
panies have undertaken may be divided into two quite dif-
ferent branches; (a) the transmission of separate messa-
ges from place to place under circumstances similar to
those incident to the telegraph business is one branch
(b) the other is the maintenance of telephone exchanges,
a system by which the offices or residences of all the
individual members of the exchange are each connected
with a central station where an agent of the exchange
is always in readiness at call to connect one subscrib-
or's instrument with another's that they may comnunicate
bLLSinPs
directly with each other. This double nature of theA
undertaken must ever be borne in mind in the legal con-
sideration of telephone companies' relations to the
public.
A Cornon Carrier of News.
In order to properly discuss the rights, duties and
liabilities of telephone companies, it is necessary
to ascertain what is the nature of their relation to the
public. The telephone is an indispensable instrument of
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commerce. The companies hold themselves out as public
servants and undertake not only to perform similar duties
to those of telegraph companies, i.e. to send dispatches
from their public offices, but also to supply a public
demand beyond that undertaken by the telegraph, to send
messages from their instruments, one of which they pro-
pose to supply to each person or interest requiring it,
if conditions are reasonably favorable. (State v Ne-
braska Teleph. Co., 17 Neb. 126 ; 52 Am. Rep. 404.)
They should,therefore, be considered as one of the great
class of coirnon carriers. (State of Missouri, ex rel.
Balt. & Ohio Tel. Co., v Bell Telehll. Co., 23 Fed. Rep.
59. Central Union Teleph. Co., v Bradbury, 106 Ind. 1
b N.E. Rep. 571. Wolf v Vf. U. Tel. Co., 62 Pa. St. 83.
contraGrinnell v W. U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299. 1IcPher-
son voV[.U.Tel. CO., 52 17.Y. Superior Ct. 232. Schwartz
v Atla,-ic & Pac. Tel. Co., 18 Hun. 157.) But it is a
coirinon carrier of news, rather than of goods. (Hocket
v State, 105 Ind. 250; 5 N.E.Rep. 178. State ex rel.
American Union Tel. Co.v the Bell Teleph. Co. 10 Cent.
L.j.435.)
Only one of the earlier cases held that a telegraph
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company is a common carrier. (Parks v Alta Cal. Tel. Co
13 Cal. 422 ; 73 Am. Dec. 589.) The judges in all the
others have hesitated in taking that step and have
spoken of them as quasi public servants(Ayers v Tel. Co.,
79 1.1e. 493.), or said with justice James : "Although
telegraph companies are not, strictly speaking, common
carriers for the reason that they do not have tangible
possession of goods which can be stolen or destroyed,
yet from the public nature of their employment the im-
portant matters confided wholly to their care, and the
skill and fidelity required in the performance of their
duties, their legal characteristics become so analogous
to those of carriers, that the law must consider them as
such, subject only to such modifications as the peculiar
nature of their business renders absolutely necessary."
(Baldwin v U. S. Tel. Co., 1 Lans. 125.) Commissioner
Earl, in Breese v U. S. Tel. Co. (4 1T.Y. 132) ) says
that telegraph companies may in one sense be called com-
mon carriers as they are engaged in a public employment
and are bound to transmit for all persons messages deliv-
ered to them for that purpose ; and then he states the
coranon objection to calling them coimmon carriers, that
they are not insurers like the comnon carriers of goods
but rather limit their liability by contract and by the
nature of their business ; and finally he asserts what,
we think, should be the accepted doctrine of the rela-
tion of telephone and telegraph companies to the public
and one which telephone cases by adopting have led re-
cent telegraph cases to adopt (Central U. Teleph. Co. v
Bradbury,106 Ind. 1 ; 5 N.E. Rep. 571. Wolfsk hi v W.U.
Tel. C0.) when he says, "We should reach the same con-
clusion if we held that the defendant was a coinmon car-
rier with all the liabilities which attach to such car-
riers at coinnon law". The courts took their stand
against the coinmon carrier theory because the telegraph
companies led them to believe that the companies could
not insure accuracy in the management of their myster-
ious 4gent on account of the startling and unknown at-
mospheric influences with which they had to contend and
the imperfection of their telegraphic instruments. But
railroad companies are now held as insurers although
they suffer great losses through accidents the causes of
which baffle the scientific knowledge of this age. The
writers on bailments also have been in doubt as to wheth-
er their subject includes telegraph and telephone com-
panics. (Schouler on Bailments, pp 277,27/M. Redfield
on Carriers, p. 398.) Gray in his "Comnunication by
Telegraph" says "A telegraph company, therefore, either
because it undertakes to comnunicate intelligence by
telegraph for such as choose to employ it, or because
the right of eminent domain is invoked in its favor, is,
as a common carrier is, in the exercise of an occupation
of a public nature." The Civil Code of Dakota, the
Civil Code of California (as originally adopted) and
the proposed Civil Code of New York very properly say :
"Every one who offers to the public to carry persons,
property or messages is a coinon carrier of whatever he
thus offers to carry. (Civil Code of Dakota,secS.l1285,
1286.) But in 1874 the California Code was amended so
as to except telegraphic messages from this provision
and the section as to the care due prom telegraph com-
panies was repealed. (Cal. Civil Code,secs. 2207,2208.)
And why cannot telegraph and telephone companies come
under the head of common carriers ? The leading fea-
tures of coranon carriers are that they are public ser-
vants or persons holding themselves out to the public as
ready to carry for any one who applies at a uniform
rate ; and that they were held to be insurers, at first
without the right of contracting against the loss of the
goods they carried. By the time the telegraph caine into
use the courts had decided that comnon carriers could
contract against losses arising from any cause but their
own negligence. And in as much as in the first case
reported, where there was no special contract attached
to the telegram, the judge said the mistake probably
arose from atmospheric influences (which may properly be
classed under the head of acts of God) and therefore
limited the damages to the cost of sending the telegram
and since in all the other cases there has been some
sort of contract as to liability, it cannot be said that
in the absence of contract the courts would, under exact-
ly similar circumstances, hold telegraph and telephone
companies to a less responsibility than they do coinon
carriers. All these remarks apply to both branches of
the telephone business, although the decisions cited
have been in regard to the exchange business. Then,
the telegraph and telephone companies have the common
carrier's lien and can withhold the delivery of a mes-
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sage until the charges for transmission have been paid.
(Scott & Jarnegin on Telegraph, sec. 120.) Further,
the courts constantly refer to railroad companies and
other carriers of passengers as coiron carriers. Cer-
tainly, passengers are not goods; nor can it be said that
the judges class these public servants as coimnon carriers
because their liability is the same as that of a corrnon
carrier of goods. For it is not. IIence we may safely
conclude that there are cormnon carriers of passengers,
of goods, and of messages, whose obligations to the
public are the same, but whose liabilities are commensu-
rate with the objects carried or the peculiar business
undertaken. And all these are comnon carriers.
LiLhts of Telephone Companies.
I'ext, what rights have telephone companies ? They
certainly have the same rights and privileges that are
given telegraplP companies (Wisconsin Teleph. Co. v City
of Oskosh, 62 Wis. 32) ; and these have the rights given
all public servants. The statutes of most states give
telephone companies the right to occupy public roads and
the right of eminent domain. (State v Teleph. Co., 36
Ohio St. 296. 2 T.Y. Rev. Stat p. 1720. Concord P.R.v
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Greely, 17 N.H. 47. New Orleans Tel. v Southern Tel. Co.,
53 Ala. 211. A case in the MTissouri Sup. Ct., cited,
iLi ALA. L. of So. Sci. I69.) They have the right to
make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of
of their business. (7reese v U.S.Tel. Co., 48 IU.Y. 132.
Young v V. U. Tel. Co., 65 1,1.Y. 163. Schwartz v Atlantic
& P. Tel. Co. 18 hun 157.) These regulations must not
contravene the constitution or laws of the country in
which the corporation exists, or violate the corunon law
or public policy. And whether they do so or not is
to be determined by the court. (Wolf v W.U.Tel. Co.,
62 Pa. St. 18:5. \Y. U. Tel. Co., v Graham, I Col. 230 ;
Allen Tel. Cases 578 ; 10 Ain. L. Reg. 319. True v Inter-
national Tel. Co., 60 i e. 9.) They may require messages
to be prepaid(Galcna R.R. v Rae, 18 Ill. 488) ; and
even require one asking for an answer to prepay the
charges of the answer. (Hewlett v V1. U. Tel. Co.,
28 Fed. Rep. 181.) They are under no obligation to
contract to conunicate an illegal or irmnoral message.
But they decide at their peril what is excluded by those
terms. (Gray on Tel., sec. 15. Smith v U., U. Tel. Co.,
2 S. W. Rep. 485.) However, if a subscriber "daims" the
company over the wire, under a regulation against im-
proper or vulgar language, he forfeits his right to use
the instrument. (Pugh v Teleph. 27 Al. L. J. 162.)
Duties and Obligations.
The telephone, by the necessities of comnerce and
by public use, has become a public servant, a factor
in the commerce of the nation and of a great portion of
the civilized world, and is to all intents and purposes
a part of the telegraphic system of the country ; in so
far as it has been introduced for public use and has
undertaken to supply a public demand beyond that under-
taken by the telegraph, so far should it be held to the
same obligations as the telegraph and other public ser-
vants. (State v Nebraska Teleph. Co. 17 Neb. 126 ; 52
Am. Rep. 409.) Telephone companies are bound to supply
to any individual or company (even though it be a
telegraph company applying) instruments and connection
with their exchanges and to receive dispatches from and
for other telephone lines, and from and for any tele-
graph lines, and from and for any individual, and on
payment of their charges for connection or for transmit-
ting dispatches, as established by the rules and regula-
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tions of the company, to transmit the same with impar-
tiality and good faith. (State v Nob. Teleph. Co., 17
Neb. 126 ; 52 an. Rep. 409. State v Bell Teleph. Co.,
36 Ohio St. 296.) These comnon law duties have been in
many states placed upon the statute books. (Title 2,
ch-. 4 Ohio Statutes, secs. 349 2, 3471.) There have been
no adjudications in respect to the obligations of tele-
phone companies where they have undertaken no more than
telegraph companies. For it seems to have been ac-
cepted without question that their obligations under
those circumstances are exactly those of telegraph com-
panies.
On the contrary, telephone companies carrying on
exchanges have persistently fought against their duty to
furnish the facilities of the exchange to any person or
corporation desiring them and offering to comply with
their regulations. The first case to come before the
courts was an application to the Circuit Court of St.
Louis in May, 188O, by the American Union Telegraph Co.
for a mandamus to compel the Bell Telephone Co. to con-
nect the relator's office with the telephone exchange
in St. Louis. (State,ex rel. An.U.Tel.Co. v sell Teleph-
Co., 10 Cent. L. J. 465.) Judge Thayer held that the
principles of law applicable to railroad companies and
other common carriers unquestionably applied to telegraph
and telephone companies ; that, instead of maintaining
offices in charge of its own agents for the reception
and transmizsion of messages at certain designated points
the Bell Teleph. Co. supplies instruments to residences,
offices and hotels contiguous to its main line and makes
all proper connections with such main line at uniform
rates, and holds itself out to the world as prepared to
supply all persons with such facilities for cormnunication
who reside or occupy offices contiguous to its establish-
ed line, and therefore in refusing to grant to the re-
lator such facilities as it affords to other customers
it has violated an imperative duty imposed upon it by
law. Six months later, the same case carne again before
the same court ; and the telephone Co. alleged that it
had acquired the right to use the telephone from the
Am. Bell Teleph. Co., the ovmer of the patent,under a
license, by whose terms it was provided, (1) that the
telephone company's patrons should not use the telephone
for "transmitting messages for which toll is paid to
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any one but the local company, nor for transmitting mar-
ket quotations, or news for sale or publication ; (2)
that the telephone company should not connect any of its
offices with any telegraph company's offices or line,
and that no telegraph company should be allowed to be-
come a subscriber." The court (Judge Thayer) ruled
(11 Cent. L.J. 360 ; 22 Al. L.J. 364) that the second
clause of the contract, if enforced as valid, would com-
pel the company to discriiriyate against a class of individ-
uals or corporations, to withhold facilities for the
transaction of business from one class of citizens which
it accords to others. This was contrary to law and
public policy. A public servant cannot avoid the per-
formance of any part of the duty it ov:res to the entire
public by any contract obligation which it may enter
into, even with a patentee of an invention. This con-
clusion did not deprive an inventor of any of the privi-
leges intended to be secured to him by letters-patent.
The telegraph company may use the telephone for the same
purpose at least that other subscribers are now using it.
About a year later, the Louisville Chancery Court
(Louisville Transfer Co. v Am. Dist. Teleph.Co.,Ky.L.
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Journ. 144 ; 24 Al. L.J. 22"3) restrained a company from
removing the telephone from the office of a transfer corn-
pany, which was a rival of the telephone company in fur-
nishing carriages,omnibusos and coupees. Chancellor
Edwards in the opinion said : "Plaintiff and defendant
are not rivals in the telephone business ; and as to
that part of defendant's business, it occupies the same
position towards the plaintiff as it does toward the
rest of the public. The principles announced in the
opinion by Judge Thayer (supra) should determine this
controversy.
After this preliminary skirmish, the Supreme Court
of Ohio was called upon to determine whether the Colum-
bus Telephone Company could rightfully refuse to supply
two rivals of the Western Union Tel. Co. with connection
with its exchange that they might by the means of it
collect and distribute dispatches ; and sometime during;
the closing months of 1881 a decision (State,ex rel. Am.
Union Tel. Co. and B. & 0. Tel. Co. v Bell Teleph. Co.
et al,36 Ohio St. 296) was rendered which has been a
leading case ever since. Here great stress was laid on
the defense that the local telephone company was not the
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owner of the patented instruments but merely the licensee
of the American Bell Teleph. Co. of Massachusetts, under
an agreement to turn over to the Western Union Tel. Co.
all messages for electrical transmission outside of its
territory. The court held that, under the Ohio statutes
preventing discrimination by telegraph and telephone com-
panies, the telephone company must receive dispatches
from or for the relators, without discrimination in re -
spect to time or manner of transmission and could not
shield itself behind any self-imposed restrictions con-
tained in the contract with the American Bell Telephone
Company. The local company had no right to engage in
business unless it acquired the rights which were neces-
sary to discharging its duties to the public. Chief
Justice McIlvaine further said : "The American Bell
Teleph. Co. (which was a defendant in the suit) cannot
be permitted to operate a line or system of telephones,
in this state, in the face of the statute either direct-
ly or through the agency of licensees, without impar-
tiality, or in other words, with discriminations against
any member of the general public who is willing and
ready to comply with the conditions imposed upon all
17
other patrons or customers who are in like circumstances.
The use of tangible property which comes into existence
by the application of discovery is not beyong the control
of state legislation, simply because the patentee ac-
quires a monoply in his discovery. Public wvrlfare re-
quires that there should be no discrimination. The writ
of mandamus to put in the desired instrument should be
made peremptory. "  Hardly a year was gone when the
Supreme Court of Connecticut was asked to pass upon an
exactly similar state of facts. (Am. Rapid Tel. Co.
v Conn. Teleph. Co., 49 Conn. 352.) The telephone coin-
pany set up the same defense as in the Ohio case- the
contract with the Bell Company. The court took an op-
posite position and said that a mandamus cannot issue
for the American Bell Telephone Company is the exclusive
owner of tre patent, and the Connecticut Telephone Co.
has purchased only the right to use the patented articles
in a certain way and it is not within the power of the
court to enlarge or diminish the purchase. The Connecti-
cut Telephone Co. is not in a similar position to that
of railroad companies or proprietors of grain elevators,
for it has never declared to the public that it had the
right to use telephones in any other way or on other
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terms than it is ready to extend to the demanding com-
pany. The utmost reach of the Connecticut statute
(which is almost word for word like the Ohio statute)
is to require the defendant to make an impartial use of
such rights or privileges as it possesses. The statute
cannot confer power upon courts either to order the lo-
cal company to buy that which cannot be bought or to use
the property of another without his consent. The legis-
lature may deny them the use of highways, but it cannot
transfer the property of one to another without compensa-
tion, even for the public good. Further the American
Bell Telephone company is located in another state and is
not a party to this proceeding. Its lessee cannot con-
fer authority upon our courts to confiscate the reserved
rights of the lessor. Our courts may stop the misuse by
the defendant bf its limited rights, but the American
Bell Teleph. Co. is not concluded by the judgment that
it has dedicated its patent to the public. Which has
the better reasoning, the Connecticut or the Ohio case ?
We must confess that we prefer the Ohio case ; for the
Connecticut judges completely ignore the statute and
base their ruling largely on the fact that the Bell Com-
pany is the exclusive owner of the patent, a theory
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untenable in connection with Patterson v Kentucky (97 U.S,
501). However, let us see how these two contrary de-
cisions have been regarded by the courts.
In i885^Balt & 0. Telegraph Co. applied to the
United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missour,
for a mandamus to compel the Bell Telephone Co. of Mis-
souri to put a telephone in its office. The Court
(Brewer, Circuit Judge) in granting the mandamus uttered
these potent sentences in answer to the argument of being
licensees of a patentee : "I believe fully in the sacred.
ness of property ; but I think all property stands upon
an equal basis whether that property consists of gold
dollars in your pocket, real estate or the ownership of
a patent. There is no peculiar sanctity hovering over or
attaching to the ownership of a patent. It is simply
a property right to be protected as such. Starting
from that as a basis, while every property owner may de-
termine for himself to what he will devote his property,
yet the moment he puts that property into what I perhaps
may, for the lack of a better expression, define as a
channel of coirnerce, that moment he subjects that proper-
ty to the laws which control coruniercial transactions,
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just as has been held in regard to warehouse, railroad
and express charges." Legislatures and courts can mo-
modify leases and licenses, and control duties. "The
moment the licensor, the Ain. Bell Teleph. Co., permitted
the establishnent of a telephonic system here, that mo-
ment it put such telephonic system within the control of
the state of Missouri, and the control of the courts,
enforcing the obligations of a coimmon carrier. A tele-
phonic system is simply a system for the transmission
of intelligence and news. It is, perhaps, in a limited
sense, and yet in a strict sense, a comnon carrier.
It must be equal in its dealings with all. It cannot
open its system to doctors and not to lawyers." (State
of Mo. ex rel. B.: O.Tel. Co. v 'ell Teleph. Co.(local),
23 Fed. Rep. 539.) But he acnitted that if it refused
connection to the Western Union it could refuse the same
facilities to the relator. This admission shows a nar-
rowing down of the doctrine of Judge Thayer in the St.
Louis case. District Judge Treat dissented on the
ground that the court had not jurisdiction of the licen-
sor and distinguished the Ohio case from the Connecticut
case in that respect. (So it is to be noted here that
the U.S. Circuit Court has decided-U-U.S. v Bell Teleph
Co.,29 Fed. Rep. 17-that the kn. Bell Teleph. Co. is
not doing business in Ohio by allowing its licensees to
use its instruments there, and that service upon an of-
ficer of one of the local companies is not a ffood ser-
vice on it. And yet it was there admitted, and offi-
cial investigations have shown, that the Massachusetts
Company owns stock in nearly all these local companies.)
The case was certified to the U.S. Supreme Court ; but
since the Bell Company and the W. U. Telegraph Co. have
adopted their old tactics in buying in recently the
B.& 0. Telegraph Co., it is doubtful if that highest
court will very soon decide the question.
A year later, the B.& 0. Tel. Co. brought before
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the same question of
the right of a telephone company to supply the Western
Union with an instrument and refuse the complainant the
same privilege. (Bell Teleph. Co. v Com. ex rel. D.& 0.
Tel. Co., 65 Al. L. J. 4 ; 3 Cent. Rep. 907.) That
court adopted without dissent the opinion of the judge of
the lower court, that the company must supply the com-
plainant with a telephone. The telephone company here
put in a new defense that by a contract with VW.U.Tel. CO.
to settle all their litigation as to telephone patents,
the American Bell Telephone Co. agreed to give the
Uestern Union Telegraph Co. the exclusive vight to use
the exchanges to collect telegraphic dispatches. The
judge replied that the contract was void because tele-
phone companies are governed by the rules applied to
coirnon carriers ; further, that the Pennsylvania statute
as to discrimination by telegraph companies applies here;
that the Al. Bell Co. was not an indispensable party; and
that the opinion in the Ohio case expressed the proper
view of the situation. Last year the Court of Appeals
of MJiaryland gave an opinion upon a similar state of
facts. (Chesapeake & Potomac Teleph. CO. v B.& 0. Tel.
Co., '55 Al. L.J. 2'71.) They ruled that telegraph and
telephone companies are public vehicles of intelligence
and are required to be impartial by a law, the same as
the laws of Ohio and Connecticut ; that such laws are
constitutional has been settled by Munn v Illinois (94
U.S. 113) ; that licensing exchanges at once dedicates
the instrnents to the public ; that the use of a patent-
ed article can be controlled by a state ; and that the
reasoning the Ohio and Philadelphia cases was the better.
New York also has begun to make law in this particu-
lar branch of the telephone discussion. Upon an applic:-
23
tion to a Special Term of the Supreme Court for a mandam-
us to compel the Hudson River Telephone Co. to connect
the office of the Postal Telegraph Cable Co. with its
exchange, Justice Parker, in May 1887, rendered an opin-
ion which shows a close scrutiny of the subject. (Peo-
ple v Hudson River Teleph. CO., 19 Abb. 11. C. 466 ; 10
N.Y. S. R. 282) Ile says : "The owner of a patent has
the right to determine whether or not any use shall be
made of his invention, and, if any, what such use shall
be. When, however, he determines upon its use his legal
duty to the public requires that all persons shall, in
respect to it, be treated alike, without injurious dis-
crimination as to rates or conditions. The authorities
establish the principle that a public servant, as the
defendant is, cannot so use the invention protected by
the government, as to withhold from one citizen the ad-
vantages which it accords to another ; and it follows
that the relator in this case on compliance with the
usual terms, and reasonable regulations of the defendant,
is entitled to have mandamus issue directing the
placing of one of its telephones in relator's office."
The relator complained that two of the regulations of
the telephone company were unreasonable. Judge Parker
24
said that the first-that the telephones are not to be
used for any part of the work of collecting, transmitting
or delivering any message in respect of which any toll
has been or is to be paid to any party other than the
exchange- is reasonable, for one common carrier cannot
demand, as a right, that it be permitted to use a rival
coirnon carrier's property for the benefit of its own
business (Barney v 0. B. & H. Steamboat Co.,70 N.Y.301.
Express Cases, i17 U.S. l.Iiow the parties are rivals as
to the transmission of dispatches beyond the territorial
limits of the telephone company is not apparent.); nor
does the New York statute require it. (Laws of 1845
Ch. 265,sec. 11 as amended L.of 1855, Ch. 559 ; 2 R. S.
1719. The law of 1845 is almost identical with the Ohio,
Penn., Conn. & 1d. statutes. But Ch. 559 of L.1855 con-
tains the proviso that the statute of 1845 shall not re-
quire a telegraph company to receive or transnit dis-
patches from or for a company owning a line of telegraph
parallel with or doing business in competition with the
line over which the dispatch is required to be sent.)
But he says that the second regulation- that the tele-
phone shall not be used for calling messengers except
from the Central Office-is unreasonable and void.
25
"The messenger business is a distinct and separate busi-
ness, and in no wise essential to the conduct of the
defendent's system of transmitting messages by telephone
for which it was incorporated. To extend the rule pro-
tecting its business from rivals, so as to include any
other business in which it might see fit to engage,
could result in great injustice to the public. The
Louisville Transfer Co. v Am. Dist. Teleph. Co. is ap-
plicable here." And it was further ordered that after
three months use of the telephone, the defendants may
apply for an order to settle what shall be a reasonable
compensation. From this ,perhaps lengthy review of the
authorities, it must be seen that the decision of the
Ohio Court laying down the duties of the telephone Com-
pany is the one most generally followed in this country
(27 Al. L.J.242) and requires a telephone company to sup-
ply an instrument to any telegraph company asking for
it.
Only once is it reported that a telephone company
refused to open its facilities to any individuals. A
Lawyer in Lincoln, Neb., refused to pay a telephone Com-
pany the rent for a time when he was not supplied with a
directory of subscribers ; and the company removed his
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instruinont ; he sought the aid of the courts. The Su-
premo Court of Nebraska in an able opinion (State v N eb.
Teleph. Co., 17Neb. 126 ; 52 Ain. Rep. 4.04) discussed
vory thoroughly the relation of the telephone to the
public and hold that in as much as the relator had ten-
dered the amounts required of other subscribers the tole-
phone company was bound to furnish him with a complete
set of instruments ; its remedy for the rent claimed to
be due was by an action for the same. So much for one
of the most interesting branches of telephone law.
In the line of our previous reasoning, li]:e tele-
graph companies, telephone companies must employ compe-
tent anL skillful operators and other agents and ser -
vants in all respects competent for the discharge of
their principal duties, and see that these have skill
and that they apply it. (Graham v VI.U.Tol.Co. Allen's
Tel. Oases, 578,581 ; 10 Ain. L.Reg. N.S. 319) Or, in
other words, in the absence of special contract, they
are bound to transmit messages and operate their ex-
changes with care and diligence adequate to the business
which they undertake. (Breese v U.S. Tel. Co.,48 N.Y.
132. Wolfskehl v .U.Tel. Co., 12 I,.Y. S.R. 555.) And
that has been held in telegraph cases to mean the high-
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est degree of care and diligence. (Graham v Yf. U. Tel.
Co., supra. W.U. Tel. Co. v Carew 15 Tlich. 525,533.)
But it is plain that a telephone company would not be
obliged to employ telegraph operators ; persons compe-
tent and skillful in the manipulation of the telephone
are all that are required. For a broach of this duty,
the company would be liable to an injured party. A
telephone lawyer writes : "I suppose it will be confessed
that whore one subscriber talks directly with another,
there is no question of responsibility on the part of
the telephone company." (18 An. J.of So. Sei. 163.)
No, it will not ; it should be liable for damages arisinr,
from defective instruments or lines or from negligence
at the central office of the exchange.
Whenever we send a telephone dispatch, we are re-
quired to write our message on a blank which contains
at the top an agreement similar to that used on telegraph
blanks, that the company shall not be held liable for
errors, mistakes or delays in transmitting, receiving,
delivering or forwarding the message, nor for non-deliv-
ery, however occuring, beyond the amount paid for its
transmission, nor unless a claim therefor be presented
in writing within thirty days after sending the message.
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Even though one has never read that agreement, by writing
his message below it he is estopped from denying that he
assented to the terms of it. (Grinnell v W.U.Tel. Co.,
113 JIass. 299. Breese v U.S. Tel. Co., 48 N.Y. 132.)
Undoubtedly the provision limiting the time within which
claims must be presented is reasonable ; for a similar
limit of sixty days on telegraph messages which may be
sent enormous distances has been hold reasonable.
(Young v W.U.Tel. Co., 65 N.Y. 163. W.U.Tel. Co. v Mere-
dith, 95 Ind. 93.) The other stipulation against loss
in a contract with a telegraph company would be held
void in Maine, Illinois or Wisconsin. (Bartlett v W.U.
Tel. Co., 62 1.e. 209. Ayer v Telegraph Co., 79 11e. 493.
W.U.Tel. Co. v Tyler, 74 Ill. 168. Candee v 71.U.Tel. Co.
34 Wis. 471.) For like other coimrion carriers they can-
not stipulate against their own negligence. In many
other states--particularly, Massachusetts (Grinnell v
W.U.Tel. Co.,113 Mass. 299), New York, Nebraska and lich-
igan-- these companies can by contract relieve themselves
from liability except for gross negligemce, wilful mis-
conduct or fraud on their own part or that of their agents.
The modus oporandi of telephoning being simpler than
telegraphy, telephone companies should not be allowed to
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stipulate against any negligence. Ilor should they be
allowed to limit the damages in case of failure or de-
lay in transmission, mistake or delay in delivery, or
non-delivery of a message to the amount of toll paid.
Amd they will, undoubtedly, be held liable for such dam-
ages as nay directly ensue to the receiver in consequence
of their tardiness or misdelivery of a message, whenever
this appears inexcusable or to be a negligent performance
of their duty to the public. (Schouler on 2ailinents
note, page 278. Yfolfskehl v W. U. Tel. Co., 12 N.Y.S.R.
555.)
Telephone Legislation.
Under the police power by which it is customary to
regulate the charges of ferrymen, common carriers, hack-
men, bakers, innkeepers, etc., the state legislatures
can pass laws fixing the maxiinmn charges for telephone
instruments and service. (Iocket v State, 105 Ind. 250;
5 N.E. Rep. 178.) Ind the companies are bound to furnish
the organized apparatus or the usual and necessary coin-
bination of instrumnents for the transmission and recep-
tion of telephone messages. For a state can do what-
ever is necessary to pronote public welfare, not incon-
sistent with its own organic laws. The use of patented
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articles must be in subordination to the regulations of
a state. The telephone exchange is not a private enter-
prise or club, but an indispensable instrument of commerce
which has been devoted to the public and therefore has
become the ligitimate subject of legislative control.
(Marehouse Cases 94 U. S. 113.) But where a state law
imposes a certain tax upon telephone companies in lieu
of all other taxes, a city of that state cannot require
them to pay a license for the privilege of doing business
within its limits. (Wis. Teleph. Co. v City of Oskosh,
62 Wis. 32.) Where a common council has passed an ordi-
nance allowing a telephone company to occupy certain
streets and it has coinenced the erection of poles, the
designation cannot be revoked. (Hudson Teleph. Co. v Jer-
sey City, 49 N. J. L. 303) And where there are no stat-
utes on the subject, telephone property and lines should
be assessed in the mode provided for assessing telegraph
lines and property. (Iowa Union Teleph. Co. v Board of
Equalization, 25 N. W. Rep. 155.) These are the few
adjudications as to the relations of telephone companies
to the statutes.
Evidence of Telephonic Transactions.
Many contracts are made and many business arrange-
ments consumated through the telephone. And the de-
cision of cases wherein the telephone is a link in the
evidence is bound to give rise to considerable discussion
On the grounds which we have so often reiterated, all
questions as to offer and acceptance by telephone
dispatches must be decided on the same principles that
apply in similar transactions by telegraph. But how
shall statements made through a telephone be proved ?
Sullivan v Kuykendall (decided January 1885, 82 Ky. 483 ;
56 Ain. R. 901; 24 Am. L. Reg. 442 ) was the earliest and
is the most thoroughly considered decision that we have
on this subject. A wishing to corrmunicate with B in-
duces the operator at X to call up the operator at Y
where B is and ask B to talk with the operator at X, be-
cause A is not accustomed to talking through the tele-
phone. The operator at Y telephones that B is at the
office ; and then a conversation takes place between B
and the operator at X, who comnunicates what comes over
the wire to A and third persons present, and is informed
by A what the reply shall be. The point came up in an
action on a contract for the sale of personal property
and the conversation was in regard to the delivery of the
same. The operator at X testified that he had a conver-
sation on the day named with soire one at Y ; but he
could not recollect what was said. A and the bystanders
were allowed in the lower court to state what the opera-
tor at X reported to them as being said by 3. B admit-
ted that a conversation took place; but his testimony
and that of A and his witnesSes differed widely as to
what was said. The bare question is whether the testi-
mony of A and the bystanders is competent or falls with-
in the domain of incompetent hearsay evidence. The
Suprem Court of Kentucky truly says that "it is a ques-
tion of importance , in view of the astonishing growth
of the business to which it relates and one not free from
difficulty." In transactions by telegraph, the tele-
grams and copies are evidence. If the parties talk
through a telephone themselves, inventive genius may be
said to have eliminated space and it is as if they were
talking face to face. But the court ruled that B made
the operator at X his agent and what the operator said
to A was admissible. They said that the agency is sim-
ilar to that of an interpreter. The interpreter's
statement made at the time of what was so said is com-
petent evidence against the party ; and the interpreter
need not be called ; but his statement made at the time
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may be proved by third persons who were present and heard
it. The reason of the rule is that the interpreter is
the agent of both acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. It is true that the persons cannot see each
other ; nor could a blind man who was using an interpret-
er. With the expansion of business and the appearance
of new instruients of coinnerce, a wider scope must be
given to the rules of evidence. The rule of evidence
as to agent and principal is certainly the one to be
applied in this case because a person using a telephone
knows that there is one at each station whose business
it is to so act ; and the 'necessities of a growing busi-
ness require this rule. The court further says : "The
argument is at least plausible, if not correct, that the
testimony in question is competent as a part of the
res gestae, aside from the question of agency." There
was an able dissenting opinion which has been favorably
cormnented upon (22 Cent. L. J. 34 ), and which holds that
the operator at X is the agent of A who has selected the
means of communication, and not the agent of B, and that
the stateirent of the operator that he is empowered by B
to speak for him is not the best evidence of the scope of
his authority. It would seem that the court in its
decision has given up the principles which have been
heretofore applied to the coumuunication of contracts by
special messenger, mail or telegraph.
In the trial of the "Napoleon of Finance", Fish was
allowed by Judge Barrett to testify as to what Ward
said to him in a conversation over a telephone line, a
fact which was essential in proving the crime. (People
v Ward, 3 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 483,511.) And another wit-
ness who stood about six inches from the telephone was
also allowed to testify as to the conversation, both
witnesses personally testifying that they had had con-
versations on that line with Ward and at the titne in
question recognized his voice. The London Law Tiires
(28 Al. L. J. 422), prior to the Ward trial, in comment-
ing upon a case where a witness was allowed to testify
that he recognized the voice of the prisoner and that a
certain conversation took place,said : "A conversation
through a telephone is so different from a conversation
face to face, that it appears to us doubtful whether it
can be allowed to stand on the saire footing for the
purpose of evidence. Only the other day a barrister's
clerk perpetrated extensive frauds by giving instructions
by telephone in his master's voice. And on account of
the fact that a voice is often imperfectly reproduced,
a court would probably feel some doubt about admitting
conversations unless further evidence of the identity of
the speaker was given." The Albany Law Journal assent-
ing says : " vex et practerea nihii is very umsafe
evidence." But it does not appear whether there was
any further evidence of identity in the Ward case than
the recognition of the prisoner's voice ; and that is
giving quite a loop hole for wrong. The doctrine of
"face to face" in the use of the telephone, it is said,
was so strongly accepted at first that notaries public
in the West got into the habit of taking affidavits by
telephone after they had the signed affidavit in hand.
The argument of certainty of recognition was answered by
saying that notaries are not required by law to be and
are not generally sure of the identity of their affiant.
But sanctity of oath is largely due to the presence of
the officer. And laziness and inconvenience should
not leave a door open to perjury and fraud.

